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We study the rock-paper-scissors game in structured populations, where the invasion rates determine indi-
vidual payoffs that govern the process of strategy change. The traditional version of the game is recovered if
the payoffs for each potential invasion stem from a single pairwise interaction. However, the transformation
of invasion rates to payoffs also allows the usage of larger interaction ranges. In addition to the traditional
pairwise interaction, we therefore consider simultaneous interactions with all nearest neighbors, as well as with
all nearest and next-nearest neighbors, thus effectively going from single pair to group interactions in games
of cyclic dominance. We show that differences in the interaction range affect not only the stationary fractions
of strategies, but also their relations of dominance. The transition from pairwise to group interactions can thus
decelerate and even revert the direction of the invasion between the competing strategies. Like in evolutionary
social dilemmas, in games of cyclic dominance too the indirect multipoint interactions that are due to group
interactions hence play a pivotal role. Our results indicate that, in addition to the invasion rates, the interaction
range is at least as important for the maintenance of biodiversity among cyclically competing strategies.
PACS numbers: 02.50.+Le, 07.05.Tp, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors, and scis-
sors are broken by a rock. This is the simple blueprint of the
rock-paper-scissors game, where the three competing strate-
gies form a closed loop of dominance. The game is popular
among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that
have no obvious winner, but it is also the basis for the expla-
nation of fascinating evolutionary processes that describe the
essence of predator-prey interactions and evolutionary games
[1–4]. Foremost, games of cyclic dominance play a prominent
role in explaining the intriguing diversity in nature [5–11], but
they are also able to provide insights into Darwinian selection
[12] as well as structural complexity [13] and pre-biotic evo-
lution [14].
Cyclic interactions may also arise spontaneously in evolu-
tionary games where the number of competing strategies is
three or more. For example, cyclic dominance has been ob-
served in public goods games with volunteering [15, 16], peer
punishment [15, 17, 18], pool punishment [19, 20] and reward
[21, 22], but also in pairwise social dilemmas with coevolu-
tion [23, 24] or with jokers [25]. The ample attention to the
theoretical aspects of cyclical interactions is fueled by actual
observations of such interactions in nature. Prominent exam-
ples include the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards [26],
overgrowth of marine sessile organisms [27], genetic regu-
lation in the repressilator [28], and competition in microbial
populations [29–32].
The key to the sustenance of biodiversity, in addition to the
inherent closed loop of dominance that governs the evolution
of such systems, is often spatial structure [33–35]. In experi-
ments with Escherichia coli, for example, it has been shown
that arranging the bacteria on a Petri dish is crucial for keeping
all three competing strains alive [8, 36]. Accordingly, simula-
tions of spatial rock-paper-scissors and related games of cyclic
dominance have a long and fruitful history [37–56], which is
firmly rooted in methods of statistical physics. In general, if
the mobility in the population is sufficiently small [7], the spa-
tial rock-paper-scissors game leads to the stable coexistence
of all three competing strategies, whereby the coexistence is
maintained by the spontaneous formation of complex spatial
patterns. Most intriguing recent examples of this phenomenon
include the observation of labyrinthine clustering [57] and in-
terfaces with internal structure [58].
Here we wish to extend the scope of the spatial rock-paper-
scissors game by abandoning the common assumption of sin-
gle pairwise interactions. Traditionally, when two players are
randomly selected from the population, one is able to invade
the other based on the governing food web and the invasion
rates [59, 60]. In reality, however, the fitness of each indi-
vidual player depends not only on one nearest neighbor, but
may be influenced by all nearest neighbors and beyond. Go-
ing from pairwise to simultaneous interactions in a group is
known to vitally affect the outcome of evolutionary games
[34], but this transition has been neglected in games of cyclic
dominance. To overcome this, we consider that the invasion
rates determine individual payoffs, which in turn govern the
process of strategy change. The traditional version of the
game is recovered if the payoffs for each potential invasion
stem from a single pairwise interaction, but the game dif-
fers if we consider interactions with nearest and next-nearest
neighbors for the accumulation of payoffs. As we will show,
the differences in the interaction range can decelerate as well
as revert the invasion between the competing strategies, thus
qualitatively changing the evolutionary outcome that would be
expected based on the pairwise consideration of the governing
food web. Indirect multipoint interactions that are due to si-
multaneous interactions within a group thus play a pivotal role
in games of cyclic dominance, similarly as reported before for
evolutionary social dilemmas [61].
The organization of this paper is as follows. We present the
definition of the model and the elementary results that hold
under well-mixed conditions in Section II. Main results are
presented in Section III. We conclude with the summary of the
2results and a discussion of their implications in Section IV.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We consider the classic rock-paper-scissors game, where
the three strategies cyclically dominate each other, as depicted
schematically in Fig. 1. For convenience, we refer to the
strategies as 0, 1 and 2, where strategy 0 invades strategy 2
with probability δ0, strategy 1 invades strategy 0 with prob-
ability δ1, and strategy 2 invades strategy 1 with probability
δ2.
The stationary state can be described by the fractions of
strategies where ρi denotes the fraction of strategy i ∈
(0, 1, 2) in the population. In a well-mixed system, the time
dependence of ρi is described by the following system of dif-
ferential equations
ρ˙i = δiρiρi+2 − δi+1ρiρi+1 , (1)
where i runs from 0 to 2 in a cyclic manner. Due to the defined
dynamics, the sum of all ρi is conserved and is always equal
to 1. The stationary values of ρi are easily obtained according
to
ρi =
δi+2∑
i δi
, (2)
where i again runs from 0 to 2 cyclically. This result indicates
that the fractions of strategies are determined unambiguously
by the three invasion rates. As reviewed in the Introduction,
however, it is frequently assumed that the interactions among
the competing strategies, which are summarized by the cor-
responding invasion rates, are more complex and in fact are
described by a structured population. It is known that the tran-
sition from a well-mixed to a structured population affects the
evolutionary outcome of the rock-paper-scissors game in both
qualitative and quantitative ways. The question we seek to
answer is whether the same holds on structured populations if
we go from individual pairwise interactions to simultaneous
group interactions.
For the spatial version of the game, we consider that each
player is located on the site x of a square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, where the grid containsL×L sites. The
three strategies are initially distributed uniformly at random
with no sites left empty. We adopt the strategy notation of
three-dimensional unit vectors
sx = 0 =


1
0
0

 , or sx = 1 =


0
1
0

 , or sx = 2 =


0
0
1

 .
Accordingly, the payoff of player x against the neighbor at
site y can be expressed by the following matrix product
Πx = s
+
xM · sy , (3)
where s+x denotes the transpose of the state vector sx. In the
present case, the payoff matrix is given by
0
21
δ
1 0
2
δ
δ
FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic presentation of the food web that
describes the closed loop of dominance between the three competing
strategies. Just like rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scis-
sors, and scissors are broken by a rock, here strategies 0 (medium
gray), 1 (light gray) and 2 (dark gray) form a closed loop of domi-
nance. If the game is governed by individual pairwise interactions,
the probabilities of invasion are determined by δ0, δ1 and δ2, respec-
tively. If the game is governed by group interactions, however, these
probabilities are transformed into payoffs that may dictate altogether
different evolutionary outcomes.
M =


0 −δ1 δ0
δ1 0 −δ2
− δ0 δ2 0

 . (4)
The evolution of strategies proceeds in agreement with a
random sequential update, where during a full Monte Carlo
step every player receives a chance once on average to invade
one randomly selected neighbor. In particular, a randomly se-
lected player xwill invade the neighbor y with the rate propor-
tional to Πx−Πy
2
, where the acquisition of the payoffs Πx and
Πy depends on the type of interaction that governs the evo-
lutionary process. We will refer to an interaction as a “pair”
interaction when the two competing players interact only with
each other. As already noted, this returns the traditional ver-
sion of the spatial rock-paper-scissors game, where the pay-
offs correspond directly to the invasion rates defined in Fig. 1.
Moreover we will consider two additional cases, where the
interaction range is gradually extended from the mentioned
two-player interaction via the von Neumann neighborhood,
entailing four pair interactions with the nearest neighbors, to
the Moore neighborhood, entailing eight pair interactions. In
the latter case, a player interacts with its four nearest as well
as with four next-nearest neighbors simultaneously. This tran-
sition from individual pairwise to group interactions for the
determination of payoffs is the key aspect of the current work.
In the following Section, for the sake of simplicity, we fix
the invasion rate δ2 = 1, thus δ0 and δ1 remain as the two
free parameters. For technical reasons, we also always keep
both parameters within the interval 0.2 ≤ δ0, δ1 ≤ 1 in order
to avoid heavy finite size effects reported in [57]. By doing
so, we achieve that during the Monte Carlo simulations the
L × L = 400 × 400 system size is always sufficiently large
to get reliable results that are valid also in the large size limit.
Our main conclusions, however, are robust and remain valid
in the whole (δ0, δ1) ∈ [0, 1] interval as well.
3III. RESULTS
We begin by showing phase diagrams for different interac-
tion ranges in Fig. 2, where the phases are defined accord-
ing to the rank of strategy fractions in the population. The
(2, 1, 0) phase thus corresponds to a stationary state where
ρ2 < ρ1 < ρ0. The (1, 2, 0) phase, on the other hand, cor-
responds to ρ1 < ρ2 < ρ0. In panel (a) of Fig. 2, we show
the phase diagram obtained in the well-mixed model. Since
the invasion rate δ1 determines the 1 → 0 invasion and the
invasion rate δ0 determines the 0 → 2 invasion, according to
Eq. 2 the expected result is a right diagonal across the δ1 − δ0
plane that delineates the (2, 1, 0) → (1, 2, 0) phase transi-
tion. Replacing well-mixed interactions with “pair” interac-
tions on the square lattice leads to expected quantitative and
qualitative changes. As depicted in panel (b) of Fig. 2, the
(2, 1, 0) → (1, 2, 0) diagonal becomes slightly upward bent,
but more importantly, a new (1, 0, 2) phase emerges for large
δ1 values that is missing under well-mixed conditions.
Significantly more unexpected is the observation that re-
placing “pair” interactions with von Neumann interactions
and further with Moore interactions introduces further quan-
titative as well as qualitative changes. These changes are
no longer due to the transition from well-mixed to struc-
tured populations, but are the sole consequence of different
interaction ranges. As depicted in panels (c) and (d), a new
(2, 0, 1) phase emerges for large δ0 values that is absent un-
der well-mixed conditions and “pair” interactions, moreover,
the (1, 0, 2) phase that we have observed for “pair” interac-
tions vanishes. In addition to these qualitative changes that
are due to the transition from pairwise to group interactions,
quantitative changes responsible for the shifts in the position
of the phase transitions on the δ1 − δ0 plane are also clearly
inferable.
The quantitative and qualitative differences that are due to
different interaction ranges are displayed visually in Fig. 3.
Domains that are labeled white indicate parameter regions
where different interaction ranges result in different strat-
egy rankings (qualitatively different phases), while domains
that are labeled black indicate regions with solely quantita-
tive differences between the otherwise identical phases. To
explain these surprising differences, it is instructive to start
with the well-mixed interactions. In this case, the invasions
between the players depend only on their strategies. If we
introduce spatial structure with “pair” interactions, then the
qualitative differences are expected because each player has
a limited range, and thus the invasions depends not only on
the strategies, but also on the spatial configuration of players.
These differences are thoroughly documented and expected,
and they also exist in other evolutionary games, like for ex-
ample in social dilemmas, where spatial reciprocity may help
cooperators survive where under well-mixed conditions they
would perish [62]. All the differences depicted in Fig. 3, how-
ever, do not have the same origin, and the arguments that ap-
ply when going from well-mixed to structured populations no
longer apply when going from pairwise to group interactions
on structured populations. Results presented in Fig. 3 evi-
dence clearly that both quantitative and qualitatively differ-
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FIG. 2: (Color-online) Phase diagrams in dependence on the 1 → 0
invasion rate δ1 and the 0 → 2 invasion rate δ0, as obtained for (a)
well-mixed interactions, (b) “pair” interactions, (c) von Neumann in-
teractions, and (d) Moore interactions. Phases are defined according
to the rank of strategy fractions in the stationary state. The (2, 1, 0)
phase, for example, corresponds to ρ2 < ρ1 < ρ0. The 2 → 1
invasion rate is fixed to δ2 = 1.
ences are common when going from “pair” to von Neumann
interactions (top), as well as when going from von Neumann
to Moore interactions (bottom).
Instead of the known “well-mixed versus spatial” argu-
ments, it is important to acknowledge the fact that increasing
the interaction range leads to indirect multi-point interactions
between players that may not be directly connected via the
interaction network, and which in the absence of group inter-
actions would not be involved in the same elementary inva-
sion processes. The most important consequence of this fact
is that the relation between two neighboring competing strate-
gies will depend not only on the invasion rate between them as
defined with the basic food web, but also on the presence (or
absence) of third parties. Other direct neighbors, as well as
next-nearest neighbors (depending on the interaction range),
may critically affect and indeed modify the relations defined
by the basic food web depicted in Fig. 1. To demonstrate the
validity of this argument, we study the movement of invasion
fronts between homogeneous domains of strategies, which are
the main driving force behind spatial pattern formation.
More precisely, we consider two different prepared initial
states, as illustrated in Fig. 4. Firstly, shown in panel (a), only
two competing strategies are present. Here we monitor the
evolution of the frequency change of the dominant strategy –
the so-called excess frequency – when starting from a sym-
metric initial state. In terms of the interaction range, we dis-
tinguish three different cases. In the first case, which we de-
note by P2, only the two individuals involved in the invasion
process interact with each other. In the second case players
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Differences between the phase diagrams de-
picted in Fig. 2. The upper panel depicts the differences between
“pair” and von Neumann interactions [panels (b) and (c) in Fig. 2],
while the lower panel depicts the differences between von Neumann
and Moore interactions [panels (c) and (d) in Fig. 2]. Regions in
the δ1 − δ0 plane where different interaction ranges yield different
phases (qualitative differences) are labeled white, while regions with
the same phases (quantitative differences only) are labeled black.
collect their payoff from the interactions with their four near-
est neighbors (von Neumann neighborhood, hence denoted
by N2). In the third case, we also consider the accumula-
tion of payoff via the Moore neighborhood, which we denote
by M2. Secondly, shown in panel (b), we insert blocks of
third-strategy players (red) along the interface. Importantly,
the third party is not involved directly in the movement of
the interface. The red players are fixed and cannot change
their strategy, nor can they invade other players. Their only
role is to influence the payoffs of the competing green and
blue players if the conditions for this are given, i.e., in case of
von Neumann or Moore interactions. Similarly to the previ-
ously described initial state, here too we distinguish the same
three interactions ranges, which we denoted by P3, N3 and
M3, respectively. Our goal is to determine how the presence
of third-party players influences the invasion between the two
(a) (b)
FIG. 4: (Color online) Schematic presentation of two prepared ini-
tial states that we employ to demonstrate the importance of indirect
multi-point interactions that arise due to group interactions. We fo-
cus on the movement of the invasion front between homogeneous
domains of strategies, which is the main driving force behind spa-
tial pattern formation. In panel (a), only two competing strategies,
green (light gray) and blue (dark gray) are present, and hence the ef-
fect of multi-point interactions is less significant. This initial state
is referred with subscript ”2” in subsequent figures. In panel (b), on
the other hand, the interface is laced with players adopting the third
strategy (red, medium gray) – the third party – that do not partake in
strategy invasion, but they do interact with the other two competing
strategies. We use subscript ”3” in subsequent figures when the latter
composition is used. Most importantly, if group interactions govern
the evolutionary process, the third party players will affect the pay-
offs and thus also the invasions between the green (light gray) and
blue (dark gray) competing strategies. To maximize the latter effect
when using Moore interactions, the fixed block of third party players
is of the size 1 × 4, instead of the depicted 1 × 2 that we use for
von Neumann interactions. Colors used correspond to the 2 → 1
strategy invasion, but the same schematic presentation can of course
be used for other examples as well.
competing predator-prey strategies.
In Fig. 5, we first compare the invasions between two
predator-prey strategies when pair and von Neumann inter-
action ranges are considered. As expected, if pair interactions
govern the evolutionary process, there are no consequences
stemming from the presence of the third strategy. Accord-
ingly, the P2 and P3 curves are identical in both panels. The
early evolution in case of von Neumann interactions without
third-party players (the N2 curve) is also almost the same as
the P2 and P3 case, because sideward and backward neighbors
give zero contribution to the payoffs of the players who are at
the front of the invasion. The critical impact of the third-party
players’ presence becomes obvious, however, when von Neu-
mann interaction range is applied. Here the multi-point inter-
actions that are due to the extended interaction range take full
effect. In the upper panel, the third strategy lowers signifi-
cantly the effective invasion velocity, thus leading to a slower
rise of the excess frequency of the predating strategy. It is
important to note that this effect alone is capable to shuffle
the rank of strategies, and thus qualitatively affect the phases,
because changing a single interaction rate could influence the
whole system due to cyclic dominance. But even more strik-
ingly, as depicted in the lower panel, multi-point interactions
alone are able to reverse the direction of invasion. Predators
thus become prey solely because of the nearby presence of
a third strategy. We note that group interactions do not al-
ways have such a dramatic effect on the outcome of an evo-
lutionary process, and for some δ1 − δ0 pairs the effective in-
vasion velocity between strategy domains remains practically
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Evolution of the excess frequency between
two competing strategies, as obtained for δ1 = 0.98 and δ0 = 0.25.
Upper panel shows the competition between the predator strategy 1
and prey strategy 0, while the lower panel shows the competition be-
tween the predator strategy 0 and prey strategy 2. In both panels,
results obtained with the “pair” (P2, P3) and the von Neumann (N2,
N3) interactions are compared. It can be observed that quantitative
(top panel) and qualitative (bottom panel) differences emerge as a
consequence of the larger interaction range when third-party players
are present (N2 versus N3). In case of “pair” interactions the dif-
ferences are absent between the evolutions of P2 and P3. We note
that the curves are scaled with the appropriate factor when the effec-
tive length of the invasion front is shortened by the fixed third-type
players.
unchanged, and the rank between species is preserved. The
most striking effects can be observed in the regions labeled
white in Fig. 3.
The same effects can also be observed if we compare the
outcome of pair and Moore interactions, as depicted in Fig. 6.
Results presented in the upper panel illustrate that the decel-
eration of the invasion front of predators can be even more
spectacular. In the lower panel, the reversal of the direction of
invasion is also clearly inferable. Furthermore, the even larger
interaction range that is defined by the Moore neighborhood
reveals another effect of group interactions. Namely, in the
lower panel, there is obvious difference between the M2 and
P2 (and P3) curve. The early difference is due to the fact that
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Evolution of the excess frequency between
two competing strategies, as obtained for δ1 = 0.70 and δ0 = 0.76.
Up panel shows the competition between the predator strategy 2 and
prey strategy 1, while the lower panel shows the competition between
the predator strategy 0 and prey strategy 2. In both panels, results
obtained with the “pair” (P2, P3) and the Moore (M2, M3) interac-
tions are compared. As in Fig. 5, it can be observed that quantitative
(top panel) and qualitative (bottom panel) differences emerge as a
consequence of the larger interaction range when third-party play-
ers are present (M2 versus M3). In case of “pair” interactions P2
and P3 evolve similarly. We note that the curves are scaled with the
appropriate factor when the effective length of the invasion front is
shortened by the fixed third-type players.
players at the front of the invasion are, unlike in case of the
von Neumann interaction, now able to pick up extra payoff
from more players of the front line due to the extended in-
teraction range. This in turn accelerates the invasion of the
predators and thus shifts the M2 curve above the P2 and the
P3 reference case.
Importantly, strategy configurations (not shown here)
demonstrate that the same invasion rates between individual
strategies can manifest in significantly different effective in-
vasion rates between competing domains, which ultimately
results in easily observable differences between the emerging
spatial patterns. Finally, we note that we have also tested the
robustness of our observations by using different host lattices.
For example, we have used the hexagonal lattice, where every
6player has six direct neighbors and which is frequently used in
biologically motivated settings [63], and we have found that
this lattice yields phase diagrams that are very similar to those
that we have obtained for the square lattice in Fig. 2.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied the rock-paper-scissors game on a square
lattice, thereby focusing on the transition from pairwise to
group interactions governing the evolution of strategies. In
addition to the expected effects of spatiality, which may intro-
duce quantitative and qualitative changes in the evolutionary
outcomes if compared to the well-mixed case, we have shown
that the extent of the interaction range can have likewise pro-
found consequences. We have demonstrated that increasing
the interaction range from individual pairwise interactions to
von Neumann interactions and further to Moore interactions
can both decelerate the propagation of predator strategy as
well as revert the direction of invasion contrary to its defi-
nition by the governing food web. These results cannot be
attributed to the traditional arguments that describe the tran-
sition from well-mixed to structured populations. Instead, we
have shown that the key to understanding the emergent phe-
nomena when going from pairwise to group interactions lies in
the indirect multi-point interactions between players that are
due to the extended interaction range. These effective multi-
point interactions link together players that do not meet di-
rectly, and which in the absence of group interactions would
not be involved in the same elementary invasion processes.
We have validated these arguments by studying the move-
ments of invasion fronts between homogeneous domains of
strategies, which are arguably the main driving force behind
spatial pattern formation. Based on the monitoring of the ex-
cess frequency of predators, we have confirmed both the de-
celeration of invasion fronts as well as the reversal of the di-
rection of invasion. In conclusion, we have shown that group
interactions can have a profound impact on the outcome of
cyclic dominance games, even exceeding the impact reported
before for evolutionary social dilemmas, where in the absence
of strategic complexity solely the impact of noise becomes in-
dependent of the topology of the interaction network [61].
Patterns resulting from cyclic dominance are common in
nature, ranging from bacteria [29, 30, 32] to plants [64, 65]
to the scale of ecological systems [26, 27]. Several previ-
ous works have illustrated that invasion rates between com-
peting species can influence the resulting morphology [66].
Conversely, studying the morphology can be useful to de-
duce the microscopic invasion rates between species if they
are not known, for example when bacteria or plants struggle
for space. Our model illustrates, however, that conclusions
stemming from such a procedure can be misleading, since the
invasion rates alone do not determine the final fate of the com-
peting species and their morphology. Moreover, in biological
systems, it is widely accepted to measure the invasion rates
or competition coefficients directly between species [66, 67].
The presence of a third party, however, can result not only in a
quantitative change of the invasion velocity, but may also alto-
gether change the direction of invasion. Naturally, the weight
of these arguments increases further if the number of com-
peting species increases, like for example in bacterial warfare
where more than one toxin is present [40]. Based on the pre-
sented results, we emphasize that it is important not to over-
look the interaction range, which could also be a key parame-
ter that renders reverse engineering cyclical interactions a very
difficult undertaking.
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